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This paper examines the effect of information sharing on supply chain 
configuration where the market characterized by demand uncertainty. A 
dynamic multi-stage game theoretic model with incomplete information is 
employed to capture the sequence of events. Our supply chain consists 
of two suppliers with exogenous wholesale prices and two retailers, the 
incumbent and the entrant, with asymmetric demand information. 
Informed incumbent prefers to conceal its private information from the 
entrant in order to reap more profits in the market. The channel of 
information flows is only through the first supplier and the incumbent can 
supply just from him, but the entrant is free to choose its proper supplier 
considering the point that the second supplier is uninformed. Our 
analytical model demonstrates that how the mean demand of the market, 
wherein our retailers compete, and its relation with the relative wholesale 
price of the suppliers play crucial role in equilibrium determination. Our 
results show under which circumstances separation and pooling 
equilibrium could occur in some range of demand variation. It is also 
shown that the entrant sometimes prefers to avoid information 
acquisition by choosing the second supplier and playing Cournot instead 
of Stackelberg which is more profitable for him in some occasions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Several industries and businesses follow differentiation strategies in order to attract the 
potential customers and overcome their rivals. Moreover proper implementation of this 
strategy requires a good knowledge of the market and sophistication of consumer 
demand which is costly and time-consuming. Hence access to private information about 
the actual demand of a specific market, particularly today, is a competitive advantage in 
competition that should be managed by CIOs. Controlling the channels of information 
leakage has become an important part of information management and business 
intelligence. Furthermore several competitors work with common players in their supply 
chain which potentially could share their economic information with their rivals-
intentionally or unintentionally. Zhang and Li (2006) mentioned that several managers 
have concerns about the leakage of crucial information from suppliers to their rivals. 
This prospect leads to control over all signals that a competitor might ascribe from our 
ordinary course of business such as quantity ordering to common suppliers. 
Consequently information imperatives should be considered in our profit function and be 
treated strategically.  
In this paper we explore the effect of information sharing on supply chain configuration 
in the market characterized with demand uncertainty. Indeed we examine how 
information considerations could affect the operational activities of firms. Our dynamic 
multi-stage supply chain signaling game includes four potential players, two suppliers 
(wholesalers) and two manufacturers (retailers), which will be configured based on 
informational and operational imperatives. At the beginning of the game, the first 
supplier which assumed to be the exclusive supplier of the incumbent (first retailer) 
decides whether to accept the entrant (second retailer) or not. Then the incumbent that 
have private information about market demand, places his quantity order strategically, 
while is aware of the first supplier’s decision. Acceptance of the entrant implies that the 
incumbent could lose its competitive edge (private information). Hence the incumbent 
has strong incentive to conceal the updated information from the first supplier while 
ordering. At the third stage, the entrant chooses its proper supplier. If he chooses the 
first supplier (and the first supplier in stage one accepted him), the incumbent’s order 
information will reveal to him. Finally both retailers compete on the quantity they launch 
to the market (Cournot duopoly competition). Price and profits are determined 
consequently.  
This research contributes to the available outstanding literature in IO and strategic 
information management by studying the existence of a second supplier (with different 
wholesale price) on determination of the game’s equilibria and further supply chain 
configuration. In fact it investigates analytically the effects of relative wholesale prices 
(of two suppliers) and demand uncertainty’s elements on supply chain disposition. We 
have tried to equip all the agents of the game with crucial incentives to have interesting 
scenarios. Actually we model the incumbent’s incentive of information sharing, the first 
supplier’s incentive of information leakage and also the entrant’s incentive for 
information acquisition and their effects on order quantities of retailers and acceptance 
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decision of first supplier which configure the supply chain. Four propositions and six 
Lemmas explicitly depict the results of this research which come out of the optimization 
problems of the game. Results show that how the additional second supplier affects the 
equilibia of the game and under some circumstance neutralizes the temptation of 
information acquisition. The results fill the gap of literature in this field. We also discuss 
about the scenario of exclusive supply contract (ESC) between the first supplier and the 
incumbent. Moreover the paper studies the effects of price differences between two 
suppliers. Several questions arise to answer in this study as for which constellations of 
demand uncertainty and wholesalers’ relative price, the entrant chooses informed 
supplier and for which constellations of them, informed wholesaler accepts entrant’s 
ordering?  Is it possible for the incumbent to preclude information leakage? Does the 
entrant acquire information in equilibrium? What is the role of second supplier on the 
entrant’s decision? 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In part 2 we briefly review the 
available related literature in IO and information management. Section 3 explains the 
basic general model and §4 deals with analysis and results. Finally, section 5 concludes 
this paper.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Several papers published in recent years have investigated the effect of information 
management on operation management. Indeed these studies focus on the trade-off 
between C-suits (CIO vs. COO2) of companies, the incentive of “minimum information 
leakage” versus the incentive of “maximum operational profits”. The rationale behind 
these papers including ours is to model the incentives of all active agents in supply 
chain, wherein a company works, and try to optimize this internal trade-off considering 
all external strategic determinants. 
Early papers on information sharing, studied the motivation of oligopolistic firms for 
information sharing. Gal-Or (1985), considering oligopolistic market characterized with 
demand uncertainty, concluded that no information sharing is the unique Nash 
equilibrium of the game. She modeled demand uncertainty with normal distribution 
function. Ziv (1993) designed a mechanism by which the firm will reveal the true value 
of its private information and this truthful revelation is its optimal reply. He showed that 
under some circumstances, information sharing’s benefit is more than signaling costs.  
Li (2002) pointed to two effects of vertical information sharing in two-level supply chain: 
direct and indirect effect. They showed that indirect effect (or leakage effect) motivates 
the retailers to conceal the demand information and reveal the cost information. Lee and 
Whang (2000) mentioned several examples of firms in supply chain that make profits by 
information sharing. They also empirically stated that the distribution of these benefits 
                                                                        
2 Chief Information Officer (CIO) vs. Chief Operation Officer (COO) 
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among players is asymmetric. Moreover different types of shared information were 
explained in their paper, e.g. inventory, sales, demand forecast, order status and 
production schedule. Our work deals with demand information.  
Anand and Goyal (2009) explicitly model firm’s incentives to acquire, share and 
disseminate demand information, and their impact on order quantities and sale. They 
consider one common supplier and two horizontally competing retailers. This seminal 
paper actually is the pillar of strategic information management. They have 
endogenized information acquisition decision of the incumbent retailer (with private 
information) in their model. Moreover their supply chain contains an exclusive supplier 
which our model tries to extend it to two suppliers with different wholesale prices. 
Several scholars have contributed to this exquisite paper. Kong et al. (2012) study how 
the potential of revenue sharing contracts, which can be offered by supplier to two 
retailers, can favor information sharing through the supply chain and decline the 
destructive effects of information imperatives on operational one. In fact they have 
investigated the impacts of changing the wholesale price contract of Anand and Goyal 
(2009) to revenue sharing contract. They showed that this alteration motivates the 
supplier not always to leak the private demand information of the incumbent in 
equilibrium. This could result in higher benefits for all players of the supply chain even 
the uninformed entrant. 
Özer et al. (2011) approached information sharing in supply chain considering 
cooperation and trust between different parties. They based their analytical model on 
laboratory findings that firms in supply chain cooperate even in the absence of 
contracts. Partial trust is also permitted in their model contrary to the available 
literatures. Ha et al. (2011) considered two competing supply chains each consists of 
one supplier and one retailer, with production technologies show diseconomies of scale. 
They show that information sharing benefits a supply chain under large production 
diseconomies, less intense competition, and less accurate information. For modeling 
diseconomies of scale they assume to have quadratic production cost. Two different 
types of competition (Bertrand & Cournot) are analyzed in this paper. 
 
3. The Model 
 
Inspired by Anand and Goyal (2009), consider a supply chain consisting of two retailers 
and two suppliers in which two retailers compete on the quantity they produce in a 
market characterized by demand uncertainty. One retailer is incumbent and due to long 
presence in the market has access to private information about demand. The other 
retailer is an uninformed entrant that is eager to realize the demand information. Based 
on some long-term contractual imperatives, incumbent restricted to supply its product 
from first supplier, but the entrant endogenously decides between two suppliers. Final 
product supplied from two different suppliers is assumed to be perfect substitutable. We 
index the four players- the incumbent, the entrant, the first supplier and the second 
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supplier, by 1 2, , ,i e s s respectively. All firms are risk neutral and aim to maximize their 
own expected profits.  
Game Theoretic Model. According to Gibbons (1992) we study a dynamic (multi-stage) 
supply chain game of incomplete information between four players. More specifically 
speaking, a signaling game sequentially happens between retailers through their 
quantity ordering from suppliers.  
Sequence of Events. The sequence of events is as follows: 1. The first supplier 
decides whether to accept entrant’s potential order -which implies the leakage of 
demand information to it, or not; 2. The incumbent retailer (Stackelberg leader) - due to 
its private information about market demand, places an order with the first supplier, 
knowing that it will leak this information to the entrant (Stackelberg follower) if it accepts 
the entrant. Indeed the incumbent tries to strategically manage its private information 
via its ordering process. This might result in ordering distortion and supply chain 
inefficiency; 3. Then the entrant decides between two suppliers and places its order; 4. 
Here if the entrant chooses the first supplier then the incumbent’s order information will 
be shared with it by 1s , and finally 5. All ordered quantities are launched to the market, 
and price and profits are realized due to duopoly competition. (See figure 1) 
 
Figure 1: The Sequence of Events 
 
    The first supplier             Incumbent                 The entrant               Incumbent’s order               
     decides whether             places an              decides between              revealed to the        Duopoly competition; 
         to accept                    order with                two suppliers                   entrant if it               price and profits 
        the entrant                 first supplier         and places an order              chooses s1                are determined                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                           
                                       Time 
 
Demand Structure. We assume an inverse demand function that is linear and 
downward-sloping which implies that it arises from utility-maximizing behavior of 
customers with quadratic additively separable utility function (Singh and Vives (1984)). 
Uncertainty occurs in the intercepts of inverse demand function characterized 
specifically by ( )P Q A Q= −  where i eQ q q= + is the total quantity launched to the market 
by orders of both incumbent ( iq ) and entrant ( eq ). We assume a binary support for 
random variable A that can take two values: a high value HA with probability p and a low 
value LA with probability ( )1 p− such that0 L HA A< < . We denote the mean demand by
(1 )H LpA p Aµ = + − . These priors are common knowledge between all players at the 
beginning of the game. We assume that the transactions between suppliers and 
retailers are governed by wholesale price contract. Wholesale price is assumed to be 
fixed exogenously and indexed by 1W and 2W for first and second suppliers respectively. 
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Also we assume that both suppliers have no capacity constraints to supply the retailers’ 
orders and also we avoid partial ordering between suppliers. Consistent with Anand and 
Goyal (2009) also we consider 1 1( ) / ( )H LA W A Wθ = − − , as a proxy for demand 
uncertainty as showed by the coefficient of variation. Contrary to Anand and Goyal 
(2009) we do not normalize wholesale price to zero and therefore this price appears in 
the formulation of parameterθ . 
Extensive Form Representation of the Signaling Game. In this setting the incumbent 
is the sender (informed agent), the entrant is the receiver (uninformed player), type 
space is { },T High Low= and t T∈ is a specific type of the sender, [ )0,im q= ∈ ∞ is the 
message or signal that sender sends form a set ( )M t , and [ )0,ja q= ∈ ∞ is the action or 
response that receiver chooses from a set ( )A m . (See figure 2 and 3) 
Solution Concept. Whereas we employ a dynamic game of incomplete information, 
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria (PBNE) will be derived in terms of information and 
material flows. (Gibbons (1992)) 
 
Figure 2: Extensive Form of Signaling Game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contribution. This model is similar to that of Anand and Goyal (2009) with some 
alteration and extensions: First, another supplier 2s  is also available in the supply chain 
which could affect the decision making process of entrant and first supplier. Indeed we 
have eliminated the monopolistic role of first supplier. Second, following this extension, 
the entrant decision of choosing its proper supplier becomes endogenous variable in the 
model. Third, this setting assumes that incumbent receives demand signal, if any, by 
default, i.e. information acquisition is not a decision variable (contrary to Anand and 
Goyal (2009)) and finally, the decision to leak or not leak information is made ex-ante 
rather than ex-post by first supplier, i.e., before the demand signals is obtained (contrary 
to Anand and Goyal (2009)).  
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Research Questions. This study is going to answer the following questions. For which 
constellations of demand uncertainty about A and wholesalers’ relative price 1 2/W W , 
entrant chooses informed supplier and for which constellations of them, informed 
wholesaler accepts entrant’s ordering?   
 
Figure 3: Potential Supply Chain Configuration 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
4. Analysis 
 
As depicted in figure 1, the first supplier, the incumbent and the entrant, each, should 
choose among two decisions: the first supplier should decide whether to accept the 
entrant or not (‘Accept’ or ‘Not Accept’), the incumbent’s decision is its ordering strategy 
(‘Separation’ or ‘Pooling’)3, and finally the entrant’s decision is to choose among two 
suppliers (‘First Supplier’ or ‘Second Supplier’). Second supplier here will enter the 
game just in two cases: when the first supplier does not accept the entrant and so it 
must procure from the second supplier, or when the first supplier accepts the entrant but 
it is more profitable for it to choose the second supplier. Hence potentially we could 
have 8 different scenarios although some of them are infeasible or inefficient which are 
listed as follow: 
 
                                                                        
3 Pooling strategy implies that both types of the incumbent order the same quantity from the supplier to 
conceal the leakage of demand information. By choosing Separation strategy the high-type incumbent 
and the low-type incumbent order separate amount of quantity based on different level of demand 
realization. Hence the supplier also becomes aware of the updated information. 
Order/ 
Signal 
Order 
Delivery 
Info. 
Leakage/
Delivery 
Tailored 
Order 
Order Delivery 
 
Wholesaler 1 
 
Wholesaler 2 
Retailer 1 
 
Incumbent 
Retailer 2 
 
Entrant 
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Table 1: Potential Equilibria 
 
 Scenario Remark 
1 (Accept, Separation, First Supplier) - 
2 (Accept, Separation, Second Supplier) - 
3 (Accept, Pooling, First Supplier) - 
4 (Accept, Pooling, Second Supplier) Not Optimal for Incumbent 
5 (Not Accept, Separation, First Supplier) Infeasible 
6 (Not Accept, Separation, Second Supplier) - 
7 (Not Accept, Pooling, First Supplier) Infeasible 
8 (Not Accept, Pooling, Second Supplier) Not Optimal for Incumbent 
 
As can be seen in table 1, we have potentially 4 equilibrium candidates which will be 
analytically discovered in next sections. Obviously when the first supplier decides not to 
accept the entrant it is not feasible to have two scenarios regardless of the incumbent’s 
strategy (Scenarios 5 and 7). Moreover when the first supplier does not accept the 
entrant, there is no rational incentive for the incumbent to take the pooling strategy as it 
causes operational distortion while there is no channel for information leakage. Thus the 
8th scenario is not optimal for the incumbent. Finally when the entrant chooses 2s then 
separation will not be optimal for the incumbent and so the 4th scenario is ignored. 
Incidentally the relationship between wholesale prices of two suppliers leads to clearer 
potential equilibria. Indeed if 1 2W W≤ then the first supplier offers lower wholesale price 
plus (weakly) higher information to the entrant which make him very attractive in the 
entrant’s viewpoint. On the other hand if 1 2W W> then the second supplier offers lower 
price to the entrant but cannot add any updated information to the prior belief of the 
entrant while the first supplier is able to do that. In fact in this case there is a real trade-
off between lower price and more information for the entrant which affects the 
incumbent’s ordering strategy. The following table categorizes the remaining 4 
scenarios: 
 
Table 2: Potential Equilibria with Wholesale Price Consideration 
 
2.1 If 1 2W W≤  Remark 
1 (Accept, Separation, First Supplier) - 
2 (Accept, Separation, Second Supplier) - 
3 (Accept, Pooling, First Supplier) - 
4 (Not Accept, Separation, Second Supplier) - 
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2.2 If 1 2W W>  Remark 
1 (Accept, Separation, First Supplier) - 
2 (Accept, Separation, Second Supplier) - 
3 (Accept, Pooling, First Supplier) Not Optimal for Entrant 
4 (Not Accept, Separation, Second Supplier) - 
 
As shown in above mentioned tables, if 1 2W W≤ and the first supplier accepts the entrant 
then the only incentive for the entrant to choose 2s is the higher cost of information 
acquisition. In fact as it will be explained later, there is a threshold that affects the 
decision of the entrant between two suppliers. Here we have 4 equilibrium candidates.  
Furthermore as depicted in table 2.2 if 1 2W W> then the only reason for the entrant to 
choose the first supplier is more precise demand information. So in the case of 
choosing pooling strategy by the incumbent there would be no rational incentive for the 
entrant to work with the first supplier, hence the 3rd scenario goes out. Here we have 3 
equilibrium candidates.  
For the sake of simplicity and tractability we impose two assumptions as below: 
Assumption 1: If the first supplier accepts the entrant, it will leak the updated 
information. 
Assumption 2: Wholesale prices are sufficiently high as both retailers (The incumbent 
and the entrant) will tend to sell all the received intermediate goods. This means that 
assembly costs of the retailers are low enough compared to 1W , 2W . 
In the next section we consider the first supplier’s decision as given in order to have a 
benchmark analysis in hand. For this purpose we assume that based on long term 
business relationship between the first supplier and the incumbent, there is exclusivity in 
contractual terms such that the first supplier commits not to leak the updated 
information to the entrant. Thus the first event in the game is solved beforehand. Details 
are as follow. 
 
4.1. Exclusive Supply Contract  
As benchmark analysis, we consider the existence of exclusive supply contract (Anand 
and Goyal (2009)). In this case the first supplier is precluded from information leakage 
to entrant based on some fixed contractual terms. That is the supplier makes an ex ante 
credible commitment not to leak the incumbent’s order quantity to the entrant. Hence 
the incumbent, aware of this term, takes the separation strategy and has no concern 
upon truthful ordering. Moreover the entrant must procure its order from second 
supplier. Indeed the game between the incumbent and the entrant is a static 
simultaneous-move game with incomplete information in which the incumbent sends its 
order to first supplier and the entrant to the second one (See figure 4). The point is that 
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the incumbent at the ordering time knows the exact realization of demand while the 
entrant orders just based on his prior belief. Solving this game leads us to following 
results. 
 
Figure 4: Supply Chain Configuration with Exclusivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 1: Under exclusive supply contract between the first supplier and the 
incumbent (Non-Leakage), if ( )2 13 2 2LA W W µ+ − ≥ , then the order quantities of the high-
type incumbent, the low-type incumbent and the entrant respectively are, 
( )1 1 1 22 12 6 3
ESCq A W WiH H µ= − + −
 ,  ( )1 1 1 22 12 6 3
ESCq A W WiL L µ= − + −
 ,  ( )1 2 2 13
ESCq W We µ= − +
. 
Moreover suppliers and retailers earn the following expected profits:  
( )
1 1 2 1
1 2 .
3
ESC
s W W Wπ µ= − +    (First Supplier) 
( )
2 2 1 2
1 2 .
3
ESC
s W W Wπ µ= − +    (Second Supplier) 
( )
2
2 1
1 1 1 2
2 6 3
ESC
iH HA W Wµ
 Π = − + −  
    (High type incumbent) 
( )
2
2 1
1 1 1 2
2 6 3
ESC
iL LA W Wµ
 Π = − + −  
    (Low type incumbent) 
Order 
 
Delivery Order Delivery 
 
Wholesaler 1 
 
Wholesaler 2 
Retailer 1 
 
Incumbent 
Retailer 2 
 
Entrant 
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( )
2
2 1
1 2
3
ESC
e W Wµ
 Π = − +  
                (Entrant) 
Proof: When due to contractual terms, the first supplier commits ex ante not to leak the 
updated demand information from incumbent to entrant, optimal order quantities results 
from solving a simultaneous-move game with incomplete information. Profit functions of 
high-type incumbent, low-type incumbent and entrant which should be maximized are 
as follows: 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1
2
max
max
max . 1 .
iH
iL
e
iH H iH e iH iH
q
iL L iL e iL iL
q
e H iH e e L iL e e e
q
A q q q W q
A q q q W q
p A q q q p A q q q W q
Π = − − −
Π = − − −
Π = − − + − − − −
 
Optimal order quantities are simply the answers of the first order conditions. Moreover 
0ESCiLq ≥ is the participation constraint which guarantees the entry of incumbent and 
entrant to the market which results in ( )2 13 2 2LA W W µ+ − ≥  . This inequality also covers 
the price non-negativity condition that is ( )1 23 2LA W W µ+ + ≥ . Suppliers’ profits can be 
calculated easily with equations ( )( )
1 1
. 1ESC ESC ESCs iH iLW pq p qπ = + − and 2 2.
ESC ESC
s eW qπ = . 
Retailers’ profits also have been obtained by plugging optimal quantities into profit 
functions as shown above.   □ 
Here the sequence of events is such that the first supplier based on exclusive contract 
with the incumbent does not accept the entrant’s order which is common knowledge 
between all players. Due to that commitment, the incumbent truthfully reveals its order 
based on its updated demand information and so there is no operational distortion. The 
entrant afterwards has no other choice rather than doing business with second supplier. 
Finally after order delivery from suppliers, both retailers enter the market and compete 
on the amount of output. According to the first proposition, incumbent’s order quantity 
depends on the actual realization of demand, posterior belief, which is known to it at 
ordering time while the entrant should maximize its expected profit and demand mean 
reveals in its optimal order quantity. In fact the entrant’s ordering decision is based on 
his prior belief (demand mean). Here with the assumption of exclusivity, the incumbent 
does not encounter any informational distortion such that separation strategy and 
maximizing operational profit are in its interest.    
 
4.2. Effect of Price Differences  
Here we consider two different cases with respect to wholesale prices of the suppliers, 
establish the (dis)incentives of the players and seeking the equilibrium of the whole 
game. 
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4.2.1. The First Supplier Offers Lower Price ( )1 2W W≤  
Under this price setting the entrant’s incentives in choosing 1s are lower wholesale price 
plus (weakly) higher information. Indeed even if the incumbent chooses pooling 
strategy, then the entrant can supply its goods with lower cost and its prior beliefs if it is 
accepted by 1s . Actually there could be potentially two incentives for the entrant to 
choose the second supplier: First reason in working with 2s could be the non-acceptance 
of 1s and second one refers to the cost of information acquisition. As we will show in 
second proposition, under some circumstances it is more profitable for the entrant not to 
choose the first supplier and enter the market with its prior belief. In this case it can 
produce Cournot quantity instead of Stackelberg one.   
On the other hand the first supplier’s incentive is to deliver higher volume of 
intermediate goods to the retailers in order to maximize its profit. Hence acceptance of 
the entrant is in his interest. Moreover the incumbent’s incentive in both demand states 
is to persuade the entrant that the demand is low to reach more profit in the market. 
Pooling strategy is an equipment of the incumbent to threat the 1s not to accept the 
entrant. The question here is that how credible this threat is. Actually if the incumbent 
pools (the worst scenario for 1s in this case), then how the sum of the orders of both 
retailers in comparison with the scenario of non-acceptance of the entrant by 1s  will be. 
The other point is that when demand variation is high, pooling strategy is too costly for 
the high-type incumebnt. In fact if 1s knows that the incumbent separates then he will 
always accept the entrant. As can be seen in following propositions and lemmas, the 
relative amount of the suppliers’ wholesale price ( )1 2/W W and mean demand µ play 
crucial roles here which could convince 1s not to accept the entrant or could affect the 
entrant’s decision in choosing among two suppliers and information acquisition.  
 
4.2.1.1. Separating Equilibrium 
Here we consider a potential equilibrium where the incumbent’s order quantity depends 
on the demand states (High or Low). Thus if the first supplier accepts the entrant then 
the entrant will have perfect demand information as well prior to his ordering decision.4 
Hence under this scenario a Stackelberg sequential move game with complete 
information occurs in which the incumbent is the leader and the entrant is the follower. 
                                                                        
4 If the first supplier accepts the entrant then the entrant will access to the actual demand information and 
also cheaper goods. Since the incumbent orders first, so the entrant plays the role of the follower. 
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 For future references we establish the following lemma that states the optimal 
quantities of Stackelberg game for our mentioned inverse demand system. For brevity, 
the proof has been skipped.5  
Lemma 1: If the first supplier 1s  accepts the entrant, the incumbent separates and the 
entrant chooses the first supplier 1s , then the SPNE outcomes (quantities and profits) of 
the respected Stackelberg game with complete information are as follows: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* *
1 1
2 2* *
1 1
2 ; 4
8 ; 16
Stackelberg Stackelberg
i e
Stackelberg Stackelberg
i e
q A W q A W
A W A Wπ π
= − = −
= − = −
 
 
 
Referring to figure 3, the supply chain configuration due to this scenario (Accept, 
Separation, First Supplier) can be depicted as the following figure. 
 
Figure 5: Supply Chain Configuration of Lemma 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As explained earlier in the separating equilibrium, the entrant has perfect demand 
information and realizes the demand state correctly. Consequently based on the figure 
2, in the extensive form of the resulted game the entrant infers the realized demand, 
updates its prior belief and knows on which node of the signaling game stands.   
In order to find the equilibrium, firstly we investigate the choice of entrant among two 
suppliers. Considering incentives, it is obvious that the entrant will choose more 
profitable supplier. Next Lemma describes the entrant’s decision. 
                                                                        
5  The idea of putting this Lemma here is inspired by Anand and Goyal (2009). The detailed proof can be 
found in the technical appendix of Anand and Goyal (2009) and also several game theoretic books, i.e. 
Gibbons (1992). 
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Ordering 
Order 
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Info. 
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Lemma 2: Under separation equilibrium and when 1 2W W≤ , if 2 18 7W Wµ ≤ − then the 
entrant will choose the first supplier 1s . Otherwise it will choose the second supplier 2s . 
Proof: The entrant will choose 1s if and only if 1 2
s s
e eΠ ≥ Π , otherwise it chooses the second 
supplier. As a matter of notation, 1seΠ implies the entrant’s profit by choosing the first 
supplier. If the entrant chooses the second supplier, regardless of the reason (Its own 
decision or non-acceptance of 1s ), then its profit- based on proposition 1- is: 
( ) ( )2
21 2 2 13
s
eE W Wµ
 Π = − +  
 
For calculating the expected 1seΠ , the entrant faces the following maximization problem 
based on its prior belief: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 * *1 1.max . 1 .max .
eH eL
s
e H iH eH eH eH L iL eL eL eLq q
E p A q q q W q p A q q q W q   Π = − − − + − − − −     
In order to solve the above optimization problem we need the optimal amount of the 
incumbent’s quantity in both demand state. The expected profit of the entrant by 
choosing the first supplier is: 
( ) ( )1
2
1
1
4
s
eE Wµ
 Π = −  
 
Solving inequality 1 2s se eΠ ≥ Π  leads us to the below result: 
2 18 7W Wµ ≤ − .   □ 
Lemma 3: The first supplier always accepts the entrant, if separation equilibrium 
outcome occurs after acceptance. 
Proof: Comparing the fist supplier’s profit in two cases (acceptance and non-
acceptance) concludes the result. We have: 
If the first supplier accepts the entrant, its profit is as follow:  
( ) ( ) ( )
1
* * * *
1 1 1 1. . . 1 . . .
accept
s iH eH iL eLp W q W q p W q W qπ = + + − +  
But in the case of non-acceptance we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
* *
1 1. . 1 . .
not accept
s iH iLp W q p W qπ
− = + −  
It is trivial to show that
1 1
accept not accept
s sπ π
−≥ .   □ 
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According to above mentioned Lemmas, now, we are well equipped to establish the 
second proposition which describes the separation equilibrium. Before that, as in Anand 
and Goyal (2009), we should consider the entrant’s belief as a part of PBNE. The 
entrant’s belief structure is as follow: 
( )
*
*
1,
Pr
0,
i iL
e H
i iL
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
A A
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
 >= = 
≤
  
In separation strategy, the major incentive of the incumbent is to signal the entrant that 
the demand state is low. This could be beneficial when the difference between high and 
low demand states is small enough (this term is quantified via parameter
( ) ( )1 1/H LA W A Wθ = − − ). Actually the incumbent tries to manage the entrant’s belief. On 
the other hand, the entrant’s belief is increasing in the order quantity of incumbent. This 
issue will appear as an incentive compatibility constraint in our optimization problem 
such that the high-type incumbent has an incentive to mimic the low-type. The inverse 
one is not reasonable. The following proposition characterizes the separation 
equilibrium. Here, capacities have been chosen by retailers, but quantities still not. 
Proposition 2: A separating Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium exists and is as follow: 
i. If 2 18 7W Wµ ≤ − : 
 The first supplier 1s accepts the entrant. 
 The incumbent orders: 
( )* 1 / 2iH Hq A W= −  , if demand is high 
( )* 1 / 2iL Lq A W= −   , if demand is low and 3θ ≥  
( )( ) ( )1 1* 2 3 2
2
H L H L H L H L
iL
A A W A A A A W A A
q
− − − − − − +
=  , if demand is low 
and 3θ <  
 The entrant chooses the first supplier 1s and orders: 
( )* 1 / 4eH Hq A W= −   , if ( )Pr 1e HA A= =  
( )* 1 / 4eL Lq A W= −    , if ( )Pr 0e HA A= = and 3θ ≥  
( )( ) ( )1 1* 3 2 3 2
4
L H H L H L H L
eL
A A W A A A A W A A
q
− − + − − − +
= , if ( )Pr 0e HA A= =
and 3θ <  
Consistent with its belief that: 
 
( )
*
*
1,
Pr
0,
i iL
e H
i iL
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
A A
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
 >= = 
≤
  
 
ii. If 2 18 7W Wµ > − : 
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 The first supplier 1s accepts the entrant. 
 The incumbent orders: 
( )* 2 1
1 1 1 2
2 6 3iH H
q A W Wµ= − + −   , if demand is high 
( )* 2 1
1 1 1 2
2 6 3iL L
q A W Wµ= − + −    , if demand is low 
 The entrant chooses the second supplier 2s and orders: 
( )* 2 12 / 3eq W Wµ= − + , consistent with its belief that ( )Pre HA A p= =  
Proof: We use Lemmas 1-3 in our calculation. The proof is similar to that of Anand and 
Goyal (2009), adjusted to our model with two suppliers. 
Part One: Based on Lemma 2 we know that under which circumstances the entrant will 
choose among two suppliers. So if 2 18 7W Wµ ≤ − the entrant chooses the first supplier 1s . 
Also in Lemma 3 we have shown that the first supplier always accepts the entrant. 
Hence under separation strategy, the incumbent determines its order quantity by 
simultaneously solving the following maximization problem: 
The low-type incumbent solves: 
     ( )( )* 1max .
iL
iL L iL eL iL iL iLq
A q q q q W qΠ = − − −  
       Such that  ( )( ) ( )2* 1 1. / 8H iL eL iL iL iL HA q q q q W q A W− − − ≤ −  
And the high-type incumbent solves: 
     ( )( )* 1max .
iH
iH H iH eH iH iH iHq
A q q q q W qΠ = − − −   (Unconstrained) 
Note: The low-type incumbent has not any incentive to mimic the high-type one, while 
the high-type tries to convince the entrant that the demand state is low. Thus the 
maximization problem of the low-type incumbent has a constrained which guarantees 
that off-equilibrium profit is not higher than equilibrium profit. (Incentive Compatibility 
Constraint)  
Moreover the entrant faces the following maximization problem: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
*
1 1
*
1 1
arg max . / 2
arg max . / 2
eL
eH
eL iL L iL eL eL eL L iL
q
eH iH H iH eH eH eH H iH
q
q q A q q q W q A q W
q q A q q q W q A q W
= − − − = − −
= − − − = − −
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Considering ( ) ( )1 1/H LA W A Wθ = − − , the rest of the proof for part one is similar to Anand 
and Goyal (2009). In our proof the wholesale price appears in calculation and change 
the final order quantity.6 
Part Two: Based on Lemma 2 we know that if 2 18 7W Wµ > − then the entrant chooses the 
second supplier. This choice does not update the prior belief of the entrant. The proof of 
this part is similar to the proof of proposition 1. In this scenario although the first suppler 
accepts the entrant, information acquisition is not valuable for the entrant and it prefers 
to enter the market using its prior belief.   □ 
As can be seen in proposition 2, when demand variation is high enough, here 3θ ≥ , it is 
too costly for the incumbent to manipulate its order quantity. Truthful revelation of the 
demand state is in his interest. Thus if the entrant chooses the first supplier, the real 
demand state will be transferred thereafter. Indeed when 3θ ≥ the difference between 
high and low demand realization is as so high such that the high type incumbent avoids 
mimicking the low type. In this case if the entrant procures from 1s then the game will be 
the Stackelberg with complete information as discussed in Lemma 1.  
On the other hand, when demand variation is low enough, here 3θ < , it is valuable for 
the incumbent to manipulate its ordering to convince the entrant upon low demand 
realization. The point is that the entrant is also aware of this thinking and behaves 
strategically. So when demand is high, the high type incumbent orders truthfully as 
before but the low type incumbent should ensure the entrant that demand is really low. 
Hence the incumbent should order a quantity strictly less than ( )* 1 / 2iL Lq A W= −  to 
convince the entrant that the demand is low. Otherwise the entrant might infer
( )* 1 / 2iL Lq A W= −  as an ordering of the high type incumbent mimicking low type. Thus 
when demand state is low and 3θ < , then the low type incumbent prefers to order
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )* 1 1 12 3 2 / 2 / 2iL H L H L H L H L Lq A A W A A A A W A A A W = − − − − − − + < −     . 
The other issue is the existence of the threshold which determines the choice of entrant 
among two suppliers. As shown in Lemma 2, the entrant will not choose the first 
supplier if 2 18 7W Wµ > − . This implies that information acquisition for the entrant is a 
strategic decision and entering the market with prior belief could be his best reaction. 
Indeed when 2 18 7W Wµ > −  the entrant produces based on Cournot which is higher 
compared to Stackelberg follower. Also it can sell its product with higher price which 
concludes higher benefit. But the incumbent (as potential Stackelberg leader) and the 
first supplier face the opportunity cost of not having the entrant in their desirable supply 
chain configuration as shown in figure 5. By considering the condition 2 18 7W Wµ > − , the 
first supplier can leverage the choice of entrant by decreasing its wholesale price 1W
                                                                        
6  The proof of the first part is very similar Anand and Goyal (2009, Technical Appendix). Here contrary to 
them, based on different modeling and the existence of second supplier, we consider positive wholesale 
prices which slightly affect the results. 
 M.A.KASHEFI-BiGSEM  
18 
 
(which we take it exogenous in the model). Indeed by decreasing the wholesale price 1W
the range of choosing 1s by the entrant expands which could be profitable for 1s . 
 
4.2.1.2. Pooling Equilibrium 
In this subsection we consider a potential equilibrium where the incumbent chooses 
pooling strategy such that the incumbent’s order quantity is independent of demand 
state. Hence the entrant cannot update his prior belief. Indeed, here, the only reason for 
the entrant in choosing 1s is the lower wholesale price of it in comparison with 2s , that is
1 2W W≤ . 
As it was discussed in table 2.1, under pooling equilibrium, the first supplier already has 
accepted the entrant. In fact if 1s does not accept the entrant then there will be no 
incentive for the incumbent to pool. So (Not Accept, Pooling, Second Supplier) will not 
happen in equilibrium as it is not optimal for the incumbent. Moreover as we have 
shown in proposition 2, when the difference between high and low demand realization is 
high enough ( 3θ > ), then it is too costly for the incumbent to pool and mimic the other 
type. Hence pooling equilibrium is feasible for smaller range ofθ which will be 
determined precisely later. So the question is that under which circumstances the first 
supplier accepts the entrant when the threat of pooling is credible. Following lemma 
deals with this situation. 
Lemma 4: Under the pooling equilibrium, if 12 LA Wµ ≤ − then the first supplier 1s accepts 
the entrant. Otherwise it will reject the entrant. 
Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 3, comparing the fist supplier’s profit in two cases 
(acceptance and non-acceptance) concludes the result. We have: 
If the first supplier accepts the entrant, its profit is as follow: 
( )
1
* *
1 .
accept
s ip epW q qπ = +  
*
ipq and
*
epq can be calculated based on the proof of the next proposition. To be mentioned 
here, we have: 
( )
( )
*
1
*
1
/ 2
3 2 / 4
ip L
ep L
q A W
q A W
µ
µ
= − +
= − −
 
By plugging these two quantities into the profit function of the first supplier we reach: 
( )( )
1 1 1
/ 4 2 3accepts LW A Wπ µ= + −   (*) 
But in the case of non-acceptance we have: 
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( ) ( ) ( )
1
* *
1 1. . 1 . .
not accept
s iH iLp W q p W qπ
− = + −  
Separation quantities of the incumbent can be obtained from proposition 2, so here we 
get: 
( )( )
1 1 1
/ 2not accepts W Wπ µ
− = −   (**) 
By comparing (*) and (**) we conclude: 
1 1
accept not accept
s sπ π
−≥  iff 12 LA Wµ ≤ − .     □ 
As corollary of above mentioned Lemma it can be stated that the probability of 
accepting the entrant by 1s is decreasing with respect to the probability of high demand 
realization p . (The proof is simply achieved by limit the inequality when p tends to zero) 
Now we should find out range of quantity in which the incumbent has incentive to pool. 
As we discussed before, the low type incumbent has no incentive to mimic the high 
type. Hence the optimal quantity of the low type incumbent in pooling equilibrium 
determines the upper bound of (or maximum amount of) the pooling interval ( maxiPq ). On 
the other hand the high type incumbent has reasonable incentive to mimic the low type 
and conceal the real demand state, but the question is that ‘down to which amount?’ 
Indeed the high type incumbent pools when it would make more profit than the case of 
ordering a high enough quantity which can reveal his type to the entrant. Thus the 
minimum order quantity that the high type incumbent prefers to pool determines the 
lower bound of (or minimum amount of) the pooling interval ( miniPq ). Obviously the lower 
bound should be smaller or equal to the upper bound of the interval. This trivial 
condition specifies the range ofθ in which pooling equilibrium exists.  
In pooling equilibrium, the belief structure of the entrant which is an essential part of the 
PBNE determination, based on Anand and Goyal (2009), is as follow: 
( )
max
min max
min
1,
, ,
Pr
0,
i iP
iP i iP
e H
i iP
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
p if the first Supplier accepts and q q q or
A A
if the first Supplier does not accept
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
 >

≤ ≤= = 

 <
  
Next Lemma formalizes the above mentioned discussion: 
Lemma 5: A pooling equilibrium, if exists, should belong to the interval min max,iP iPq q  
where: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
max
1
min
1 1
/ 2
/ 2 1/ 2 3 2
iP L
iP H H H H
q A W
q A W A A W A
µ
µ µ µ µ
 = − +

= − + − − − − +
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Proof: The upper bound of the interval will be determined by the optimal order quantity 
of the low type incumbent because the low type never prefers to pool on a quantity 
more than *LiPq . In fact if he orders more than this optimal quantity, the entrant might 
ascribe it as a high demand realization signal which is not favorable for the incumbent. 
For finding *LiPq we have to solve the following maximization problem: 
( )( )* 1max . .
iP
P
iL L iP eP iP iP iPq
A q q q q W qΠ = − − −  
Since the entrant cannot realize the exact demand state, he should stick to his prior and 
solve the following optimization problem: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1max . . 1 . . .
eP
P
e H iP eP eP L iP eP eP ePq
p A q q q p A q q q W qΠ = − − + − − − −   
First-Order-Conditions lead us to the optimal quantity of the entrant and also low type 
incumbent which specifies the upper bound of the interval in Lemma 5. Both optimal 
quantities are shown below: 
( ) ( )* 1 / 2eP iP iPq q q Wµ= − −  
( )max * 1 / 2LiP iP Lq q A Wµ= = − +  
Plugging the optimal quantity of the low type incumbent *LiPq into the entrant’s equation 
reach us to: ( )* 13 2 / 4eP Lq A Wµ= − −  
In order to find out the lower bound of the interval we should consider the incentive of 
the high type incumbent who prefers to mimic the low type to affect the entrant’s order. 
Indeed the high type incumbent will pool as long as the profit of pooling dominates the 
profit of truthful revelation. So the high type incumbent solves the following inequality: 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
*
2
1
* *
1 1
/8
. . max . .
iH iP
H
H iP eP iP iP iP H iH eH iH iH iH
q q
A W
A q q q q W q A q q q q W q
>
−
− − − ≥ − − −

 
After some manipulation on the inequality and find out the two roots of the resulted 
formula will get us to the lower bound of the interval as below: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )min 1 1/ 2 1/ 2 3 2iP H H H Hq A W A A W Aµ µ µ µ= − + − − − − +      □ 
Existence condition of a pooling equilibrium is similar to Anand and Goyal (2009) and 
will be got by solving the inequality min maxiP iPq q≤ . The alterations are the positive amount of 
wholesale price- which changes the formulation ofθ such that ( ) ( )1 1/H LA W A Wθ = − − -
and also the threshold (Shown in Lemma 2) after which the entrant chooses the second 
supplier. Working with the second supplier leads to separation equilibrium. 
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Lemma 6: The pooling equilibrium exists if demand uncertainty proxy parameterθ and 
mean demand µ obey the following inequalities simultaneously: 
( ) ( )2 23 2 / 1 4p p p pθ ≤ + − + −  where p is the probability of high demand realization; 
 And 
( ) ( ){ }2 1 1min 8 7 , 2 LW W A Wµ ≤ − − which causes that first, 1s  accepts the entrant and 
second, the entrant chooses the first supplier 1s . 
Otherwise there is no pooling equilibrium and the incumbent prefers to separate its 
ordering.  
Proof: By solving min maxiP iPq q≤ (As done in Anand and Goyal (2009)) we reach the first 
inequality ofθ . The second inequality on µ has been proven in Lemma 2.    □ 
The following proposition characterizes the pooling equilibrium when 1 2W W≤ : 
Proposition 3:  
• If ( ) ( ){ }2 1 1min 8 7 , 2 LW W A Wµ ≤ − − & when ( ) ( )2 23 2 / 1 4p p p pθ ≤ + − + − , a pooling 
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium exists and is as follow: 
 
I. The first supplier 1s accepts the entrant. 
II. The incumbent orders: ( )* 1 / 2iP Lq A Wµ= − +  
III. The entrant chooses the first supplier 1s and orders: ( )* 13 2 / 4eP Lq A Wµ= − −  
Consistent with its belief that: 
 
( )
max
min max
min
1,
, ,
Pr
0,
i iP
iP i iP
e H
i iP
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
p if the first Supplier accepts and q q q or
A A
if the first Supplier does not accept
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
 >

≤ ≤= = 

 <
  
 
where ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )min 1 1/ 2 1/ 2 3 2iP H H H Hq A W A A W Aµ µ µ µ= − + − − − − +  
 
• Otherwise, If ( ) ( ){ }2 1 1min 8 7 , 2 LW W A Wµ ≤ − − , ( ) ( )2 23 2 / 1 4p p p pθ ≤ + − + − or both 
does not hold, there is no pooling equilibrium and firms behave as proposition 2. 
Proof:  Proofs of Lemmas 2, 4, 5 and 6, actually lead us to the outcomes of this 
proposition.    □ 
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As shown in proposition 3, when the incumbent chooses pooling equilibrium (and it 
exists), the entrant obtains no additional demand information and should stick to its 
prior. The point is that this pooling should be beneficial for the incumbent. This issue is 
determined by the condition onθ . Indeed whenθ is high it is too costly for the high type 
incumbent to mimic the low type and separation will occur.  
The other important point is preconditions for existence of pooling equilibrium. In fact 
information acquisition should be profitable for the entrant which is captured by
2 18 7W Wµ ≤ − . Moreover the first supplier accepts the entrant as long as the profit he 
would make from acceptance (besides the threat of pooling strategy) dominates the 
choice of non-acceptance. This also causes to impose a restriction on mean demand 
that is 12 LA Wµ ≤ − . Hence ( ) ( ){ }2 1 1min 8 7 , 2 LW W A Wµ ≤ − − is the necessary condition for 
existence of any pooling equilibrium. 
 
4.2.2. The Second Supplier Offers Lower Price ( )2 1W W<   
Under this pricing regime, the only incentive of the entrant for choosing 1s  is its potential 
updated information. It implies that if the incumbent pools on its quantity ordering, then 
the entrant will choose the cheaper wholesaler in equilibrium. As we have shown in 
table 2.2, if 1 2W W> we could have potentially three possible equilibria where in two 
cases, the first supplier accepts the entrant and the incumbent separates. Hence the 
exact equilibrium will be determined by the decision choice of the entrant among two 
wholesalers. Whereas the second supplier offers more attractive price, we have a real 
trade-off for the entrant between higher levels of demand information (which could be 
obtained by choosing 1s ) and lower price of the product (which is offered by 2s ). This 
decision will configure our supply chain. Also as we have explained in Lemma 3, under 
separation, the first supplier 1s  always accepts the entrant (in equilibrium). Hence only 
two equilibrium candidates remain. As significant calculations have been done so far, 
we go directly to state the result. 
Proposition 4: If 2 18 7W Wµ ≤ − and 2
1
0.875 1W
W
≤ ≤ , then in equilibrium, the first supplier 1s
accepts the entrant, the incumbent separates and the entrant prefers 1s . The optimal 
quantities of the players and the belief structure of the entrant are as stated in the first 
part of proposition 2. Otherwise if one or both of above mentioned conditions does not 
hold, then in equilibrium, the first supplier 1s  accepts the entrant, the incumbent 
separates and the entrant chooses the second supplier 2s that offers lower price. The 
optimal quantities of the players and the belief structure of the entrant are as stated in 
the second part of proposition 2. 
Proof: The proof is similar to the methods we have followed in Lemmas 1-3 and 
proposition 2. The added condition on the relative amount of wholesale prices stems 
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from the fact that 1 2W W> which causes the imposition of inequality 2 10 8 7W Wµ≤ ≤ − . In 
previous subsection as 1 2W W≤ , the mean demand was always positive but here in order 
to have non-negative mean demand we should have 2 10 8 7W W≤ − . This leads us to a 
condition on wholesale prices 2
1
7 0.875 1
8
W
W
= ≤ ≤ .     □ 
As expresses in proposition 4, when the entrant has access to a supplier with lower 
price, the range of relative wholesale price 2 1/W W  is more restricted. In fact if the price of
2s is much lower than 1s such that the condition ( )2 10.875 /W W≤ would not hold, then the 
entrant will ignore the updated demand information and work with the second supplier. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we presented a model to investigate the strategic effects of information 
sharing on supply chain configuration with vertical structure. We considered a typical 
supply chain containing two suppliers (wholesalers) that could potentially supply 
intermediate (final) goods to two manufacturers (retailers), an incumbent and an entrant. 
The incumbent is assumed to do business only with the first supplier (potential channel 
of information leakage from incumbent to entrant) while the entrant is free to choose its 
supplier strategically. A dynamic multi-stage game of incomplete information between 
these four economic agents was employed: The first supplier starts the game by his 
decision upon (none) acceptance of the entrant followed by the quantity order decision 
of the incumbent, then the entrant decides between two suppliers and places his order 
(considering their wholesale price and updated information) and finally, both retailers 
play a Cournot duopoly game on the amount of quantity they launch to the market 
characterized by demand uncertainty. Our model contributed to the literature in IO and 
strategic information management by considering a second supplier which gives a 
degree of freedom to the entrant in choosing its supplier. Methodologically, a signaling 
game was applied to model the strategic interactions of players. Hence, Perfect 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) has been derived in terms of information and 
material flows.  
We showed that how the difference between wholesale prices 1 2,W W , the elements of 
mean demand ( ). 1 .H Lp A p Aµ = + − , and also the range of demand variation
( ) ( )1 1/H LA W A Wθ = − − , select an equilibrium from the set of candidates. Moreover it 
was demonstrated that information acquisition is not always desirable for an uninformed 
entrant and how the entrant prefers to trade off between price and information, playing 
Cournot or Stackelberg. Furthermore existence of pooling equilibrium for sufficiently 
small demand variation confirms the significant role of strategic information 
management whereby the incumbent is able to keep its competitive advantage and 
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preclude the leakage of information. Add a second supplier to the seminal model of 
Anand and Goyal (2009), actually empowers us to involve the first supplier more 
actively. This extension gives the entrant an opportunity to choose its own supplier 
endogenously. In addition, the existence of pooling equilibrium besides the separation 
one implies that more accurate demand information (in the form of lowerθ ) enables the 
incumbent to conceal its private information while less accuracy leads to truthful 
ordering and neutralize the asymmetric dominancy. 
 Our model dealt with exogenous wholesale prices which restrict the role of suppliers. 
Further research can endogenize the pricing of suppliers in the model. Indeed price 
competition between two suppliers makes the research more interesting and realistic. 
Moreover we imposed a restriction on choice of the incumbent between suppliers which 
can be released in oncoming works. Partial supply also can be investigated. Finally for 
the sake simplicity we avoided to examine the level of information quality which is worth 
examining.  
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